Rescuing Policy and Terror Victims: A Concerted Approach to the Ransom Dilemma by Bundy, C. Elizabeth
Michigan Journal of International Law 
Volume 37 Issue 4 
2016 
Rescuing Policy and Terror Victims: A Concerted Approach to the 
Ransom Dilemma 
C. Elizabeth Bundy 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil 
 Part of the International Law Commons, Military, War, and Peace Commons, and the National Security 
Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
C. E. Bundy, Rescuing Policy and Terror Victims: A Concerted Approach to the Ransom Dilemma, 37 MICH. 
J. INT'L L. 717 (2016). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil/vol37/iss4/4 
 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Journal of International Law at University of 
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Journal of 
International Law by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more 
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
NOTE
RESCUING POLICY AND TERROR VICTIMS:
A CONCERTED APPROACH TO
THE RANSOM DILEMMA
C. Elizabeth Bundy*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
THE VALUE OF A HOSTAGE: PROFITABLE TRADE, PRECIOUS
TREASURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 717
I. AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR
TERROR–DRIVEN KIDNAPPINGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 720
A. Terrorist Financing: An International Offense . . . . . . . . 720
B. Implications of the Assets Freeze: Ransom as a Form
of Terrorist Financing? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 723
II. STATE PRACTICE: POLICY–ORIENTED APPROACHES AND
SHORTCOMINGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 728
A. “Hard” Policy: No Concessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 729
B. “Soft” Policy: A Permissive Approach, or Concealing
Concessions? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 733
C. Bridging the Gap: A Deep Divide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 736
III. THE WAY FORWARD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 737
A. State–centered Model: Responsibility–Shifting to the
States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 737
B. Ransom or Rescue? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 740
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 745
THE VALUE OF A HOSTAGE: PROFITABLE TRADE,
PRECIOUS TREASURE1
After months in captivity with twenty-two other hostages, journalist
James Foley became the first to be publicly beheaded by the Islamic State
* J.D., May 2016, University of Michigan Law School. Along with the MJIL editorial
members and J.D. Andrew Sand, I would like to thank Professors Bromberg, Hakimi, and
Ratner for their insightful comments, and Francisco Ceballos for his continued support and
encouragement. All views expressed herein (along with any errors) remain my own.
1. Nasser al-Wuhayshi, Al-Qaida Papers: How to Run a State, Second Letter from
Abu Basir to Emir of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, http://hosted.ap.org/specials/interact
ives/_international/_pdfs/al-qaida-papers-how-to-run-a-state.pdf (“Kidnapping hostages is an
easy spoil, which I may describe as a profitable trade and a precious treasure.”). Al-
Wuhayshi, leader of al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, also wrote that “most of the battle
costs, if not all, were paid from through the spoils,” and that “almost half the spoils came
from hostages,” indicating the importance of kidnapping operations to the organization’s
funding.
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group (Daesh)2 on August 19, 2014.3 His death was preceded by extended
negotiations for the release of fifteen other captives;4 shortly thereafter,
most of Foley’s hostage-mates were freed in exchange for substantial and
varying, though largely undisclosed, amounts.5 What is striking about this
group is that, of at least twenty-three hostages from twelve states held
together over fourteen months, only the captives of countries refusing to
concede ransoms were ultimately executed.6
This tragic chapter demonstrates the difficulties underlying states’ di-
vergent approaches to hostage situations. The execution of several nation-
als of no-concessions states on the one hand, together with the ransomed
release of their fellow hostages on the other, call into question the effec-
tiveness of the United States’ and United Kingdom’s strict no-concessions
approach in deterring kidnappings of their own nationals. Conversely, the
payment of ransoms by states favoring a more flexible approach reinforces
the ability of perpetrators to carry out further kidnapping operations.
From a legal standpoint, ransoms have never been explicitly prohib-
ited through the terrorist financing regime following September 11, 2001
or under any of the relevant multilateral Conventions. Beginning in 2014,
however, the United Nations Security Council issued several resolutions to
address Daesh, some of which specifically provided for restrictions on ran-
som payments.7 Although the resolutions call on states to prevent the ben-
efits accruing “from using kidnapping to raise funds or gain political
concessions,”8 the absence of an overt prohibition on such payments
themselves injects a measure of ambiguity into the framework governing
the flow of finances to terrorist organizations. Furthermore, continued
payments by certain states undercut the view that the sanctions regime
prohibits ransoms to non-state terrorist actors.
2. For an explanation of why “Daesh” is used over other terms (e.g., ISIS, ISIL, Is-
lamic State), see Nike Ching, Why Kerry Calls Terror Group ‘Daesh,’ Not Islamic State,
VOICE OF AMERICA (Jan. 15, 2016), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2014/10/09/words-
matter-isis-war-use-daesh/V85GYEuasEEJgrUun0dMUP/story.html); Faisal Irshaid, Isis, IS
or Daesh? One group, many names, BBC (Dec. 2, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
middle-east-27994277; Zeba Khan, Words matter in ‘ISIS’ war, so use ‘Daesh’, BOSTON
GLOBE (Oct. 9, 2014), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2014/10/09/words-matter-isis-
war-use-daesh/V85GYEuasEEJgrUun0dMUP/story.html.
3. See, e.g., Rukmini Callimachi, Militant Group Says it Killed American Journalist in
Syria, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/20/world/middleeast/isis-
james-foley-syria-execution.html.
4. See Rukmini Callimachi, The Horror Before the Beheadings: ISIS Hostages En-
dured Torture and Dashed Hopes, Freed Cellmates Say, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2014), http://
www.nytimes.com/2014/10/26/world/middleeast/horror-before-the-beheadings-what-isis-hos-
tages-endured-in-syria.html.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2133 (Jan. 27, 2014); S.C. Res. 2160 (June 17, 2014); S.C. Res.
2161 (June 17, 2014); S.C. Res. 2199 (Feb. 12, 2015).
8. S.C. Res. 2133, ¶ 3 (Jan. 27, 2014).
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At the practical level, terrorist kidnappings call for a more nuanced
response by affected states. Daesh’s most recent kidnappings demonstrate
not only the limited effectiveness of a no-concessions policy in deterring
terror-driven kidnappings, but also the potential for pro-ransom policies to
fund terrorist actors. Moreover, states that are unwilling to engage in ne-
gotiations themselves effectively delegate that role to a less capable pri-
vate sector and often leave insurers and families in a legally tenuous
position in their efforts to secure ransomed release. Finally, the general
lack of a coordinated effort during rescue attempts many times results in
failed hostage rescue operations or the unintended deaths of those held
captive.
Such problems lead firstly to the question of the legality of ransoms
under international law and, secondly, to the role states can and should
play in addressing hostage situations. In surveying these problems, Part I
of this Note will analyze the current framework governing hostage situa-
tions to determine the permissibility of ransom payments under interna-
tional law. Part II will examine the two dominant positions that have
developed among states and identify the justifications and shortcomings of
each. Part III will conclude, firstly, that for states to develop a multilateral
approach to hostage situations, they must take the lead within their re-
spective domestic spheres and, secondly, that the option to negotiate for
ransomed release should be preserved as an essential tool for confronting
terrorist organizations.
In examining these points, analysis may draw from piracy-driven
kidnappings because of the substantial similarities they bear to hostage
situations involving non-state terrorist groups.9 Although the former cate-
gory is frequently distinguished as falling within a less egregious branch of
criminal enterprise, perpetrators in both contexts pose significant risk to
captives and may operate through diffuse international networks.10 Simi-
larly, to maintain a narrow focus on the permissibility of ransoms, other
forms of concessions such as prisoner exchanges are considered to fall
outside the scope of this Note. Instead, this Note will focus narrowly on
the issue of kidnappings facilitated by non-state groups that have been
designated as terrorists under the auspices of the United Nations.11
9. See, e.g., Lucas V.M. Bento, Preserving Negotiation Whilst Promoting Global Or-
der: Should We Bargain with Salt-Water Devils?, 19 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 285, 301 (2014).
But see id. at 301–04; Lawrence Rutkowski et al., Mugged Twice?: Payment of Ransom on the
High Seas, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1425, 1431–32 (2010).
10. See Bento, supra note 9, at 301.
11. There is currently no internationally agreed upon definition of “terrorist” or “ter-
rorism.” See, e.g., Ben Saul, Attempts to Define ‘Terrorism’ in International Law, 52 NETH.
INT’L L. REV. 57 (2005). For purposes of the present analysis, this Note will therefore only
refer to parties included on the Consolidated List of individuals and entities associated with
al-Qaida and the Taliban, which is maintained by the U.N. al-Qaida Sanctions Committee.
See Consolidated United Nations Security Council Sanctions List, https://www.un.org/sc/
suborg/sites/www.un.org.sc.suborg/files/consolidated.pdf (last updated May 13, 2016). For ad-
ditional material on the Sanctions Committee and the listing procedures more generally, see
Lisa Ginsborg, The United Nations Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Al-Qaida Sanctions
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Finally, despite the numerous non-state groups that fit this category,
this Note will draw primarily upon examples provided by the recent
kidnappings and executions perpetrated by Daesh. Although reference
may be made to other groups or historical examples, the kidnappings that
occurred during the 2014-2015 period are particularly relevant. Not only
were they the catalyst that sparked recent developments concerning the
lawfulness of ransoms, but they also prompted at least one country to un-
dergo substantial revision of its policy on this issue.12
I. AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR
TERROR-DRIVEN KIDNAPPINGS
Before examining the policy divide over ransom payments to terrorist
organizations, a preliminary question pertains to the permissibility of such
payments under international law. Accordingly, this Section provides a
brief historic overview of the current legal regime governing hostage situa-
tions, before surveying recent resolutions issued by the Security Council.
The following analysis demonstrates that contemporary developments,
while preserving a measure of flexibility for private parties responding to
hostage situations, simultaneously inject uncertainty regarding the lawful-
ness of ransoms into the existing legal framework.
A. Terrorist Financing: An International Offense
Historically, the instruments that bear most directly on the question of
kidnapping are the 1979 International Convention Against the Taking of
Hostages (Hostages Convention)13 and the 1999 International Convention
for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (Terrorist Financing
Convention).14 Adopted in response to earlier kidnappings including the
OPEC siege, the Entebbe hijacking, and the Iran hostage crisis,15 the Hos-
tages Convention defines the offense of hostage-taking and obliges states
to cooperate in arresting, prosecuting, and punishing perpetrators.16 De-
spite a strict approach to kidnappers with “no exception for any actor
(State or non-State) or cause,”17 the treaty does not specify measures ap-
Regime: Resolution 1267 and the 1267 Committee, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AND TERRORISM 608, 608-25 (Ben Saul ed., 2014).
12. See discussion infra Part III.B.
13. 1979 International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979,
T.I.A.S. No. 11081, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205 (entered into force June 3, 1983) [hereinafter Hostages
Convention].
14. 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism,
Dec. 9, 1999, T.I.A.S. No. 13075, 2178 U.N.T.S. 229 (entered into force Apr. 10, 2002).
15. Ben Saul, Introductory Note to the International Convention Against the Taking of
Hostages, UNITED NATIONS AUDIOVISUAL LIBRARY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 1 (2014),
http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/icath/icath_e.pdf.
16. Hostages Convention, supra note 13, T.I.A.S. No. 11081 at 4–8, 1316 U.N.T.S. at
207, 208 (arts. 1–2, 4, 6).
17. Saul, supra note 11, at 3. Article 12 of the Hostages Convention does, however,
provide for the application of humanitarian law for incidents of hostage-taking that occur
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plicable to the ransoms they collect or their financers.18 Although Article
4 provides preventive methods for hostage-taking incidents, it also man-
dates that States “tak[e] all practicable measures to prevent preparations
in their respective territories for the commission of those offences,”19 re-
sulting in a narrow targeting of the demand side of ransom situations while
preserving states’ discretion to engage in negotiations.20
The Terrorist Financing Convention ventures further in addressing the
supply side by requiring states to criminalize the offense of terror financ-
ing and to freeze and seize funds intended for terrorist activities.21 The
Convention’s definition of terrorist financing as the provision or collection
of funds “by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and willfully . . .
with the intention . . . or in the knowledge that they are to be used” in
furtherance of terrorist acts22 might be read broadly to encompass fi-
nances exchanged for hostage release.23 However, the provision’s applica-
tion only to persons providing funds “unlawfully and wilfully”
distinguishes the deliberate financing of known terrorist activities, prohib-
ited under the Convention, from the legitimate interests of humanitarian
undertakings.24 The exemption of the latter category of activities reflects
during the exercise of the right of self-determination. See Hostages Convention, supra note
13, T.I.A.S. No. 11081 at 10, 1316 U.N.T.S. at 210; see also Saul, supra note 11, at 3–4, 6
(discussing the drafting history related to this exception).
18. See Saul, supra note 11, at 5; Human Rights Council, Human rights and issues
related to terrorist hostage-taking: Report of the Human Rights Council Advisory Commit-
tee, ¶ 50, U.N. Doc A/HRC/24/47 (July 4, 2013) [hereinafter HRC Report].
19. Hostages Convention, supra note 13, T.I.A.S. No. 11081 at 5, 1316 U.N.T.S. at 207.
20. Saul, supra note 11, at 7; see also U.N. SCOR, 69th Sess., 7101st mtg. at 2, U.N.
Doc. S/PV.7101 (Jan. 27, 2014) (emphasizing the need to account for individual circumstances
in each hostage situation “as provided for by the International Convention against the Taking
of Hostages, given that the Convention does not necessarily penalize the payment of
ransom”).
21. 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism
arts. 2, 4, 8, Dec. 9, 1999, T.I.A.S. No. 13075, 2178 U.N.T.S. 197 (entered into force Apr. 10,
2002).
22. Id., T.I.A.S. No. 13075 at 3, 2178 U.N.T.S. at 230.
23. See HRC Report, supra note 18, ¶¶ 52–53.
24. See Andreas S. Kolb et al., Paying Danegeld to Pirates–Humanitarian Necessity or
Financing Jihadists, 15 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 105, 133–38 (2011) (concluding that Arti-
cle 2’s prohibition of only those funds that were “unlawfully” provided operates to exclude
ransom payments from the scope of the Terrorist Financing Convention). This seems to be
the dominant interpretive position among states and legal scholars. See, e.g., Mauro Miedico,
Implementation Support Section III Chief, UN Office on Drugs and Crime, Remarks at the
Special Meeting of the Counter–Terrorism Committee on Kidnapping for Ransom and Hos-
tage–Taking Committed by Terrorist Groups 6 (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/
docs/2014/Mr%20Mauro%20Miedico%20Int%20Legal%20Framework%20speech_KFR.pdf
(highlighting the legal challenges to prosecuting a ransom financer under the Convention and
other areas of international law); CLIVE OLIVER, TERRORISM AND THE LAW 390 n.26 (2011)
(noting the discrepancy of mens rea requirements between Section 15(1)(a) of the United
Kingdom’s Terrorism Act 2000 and the Terrorist Financing Convention).
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the drafters’ intent to preserve, among other humanitarian endeavors, the
ability to negotiate for the freedom and safety of hostages.25
Even if ransom payments per se are not proscribed under existing mul-
tilateral agreements,26 the Security Council has issued several resolutions
that prohibit terrorist financing more generally. Resolution 1373, adopted
in the immediate aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks, employs
broad language to compel states to prevent and suppress the financing of
terrorist acts and to refrain from providing support to any entities or per-
sons involved.27 Like the Terrorist Financing Convention from which it is
modeled,28 Resolution 1373’s provisions do not expressly contemplate
ransom payments but focus more generally on the suppression of terrorist
financing as a necessary step in preventing further attacks. In language
very similar to that of the Convention, the mandate requires states to
criminalize “the wilful provision or collection, by any means, directly or
indirectly, of funds by their nationals or in their territories with the inten-
tion that the funds should be used, or in the knowledge that they are to be
used, in order to carry out terrorist acts.”29 While ransom payments are
generally considered to fall outside the intended scope of the criminal
sanctions mandated,30 the comprehensive (but non-criminal) prohibition
on nationals from “making any funds, financial assets or economic re-
sources . . . available” in subparagraph (d)31 operates broadly to subject
ransom financers to additional measures and serves as a foundation for
further developments on the issue.32
The Security Council also reinforced the regime on counter-terrorist
financing by imposing a freeze on the assets of listed al-Qaida and Taliban
25. See Kolb et al., supra note 24, at 136 n.109.
26. See Bento, supra note 9, at 299; HRC Report, supra note 18, ¶ 65.
27. S.C. Res. 1373, ¶ 1 (Sept. 28, 2001).
28. The Terrorist Financing Convention was not yet in force at the time Resolution
1373 was adopted. To provide for immediate implementation of the relevant state duties,
which were viewed as a matter of urgency following the September 11 attacks, the Security
Council incorporated many of the Convention’s central obligations into Resolution 1373. See
Pierre Klein, Introductory Note to the International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism, UNITED NATIONS AUDIOVISUAL LIBRARY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
1, 4 (2009); Kolb et al., supra note 24, at 139.
29. S.C. Res. 1373, ¶ 1(b) (Sept. 28, 2001).
30. A primary difficulty with applying the criminal sanctions provision to ransom
financers is that of satisfying the mens rea requirement and overcoming the defense of duress.
Whether the financer knows the funds will be used to carry out terrorist acts is a factual
inquiry for which the subjective element of intent may be difficult to establish. Similarly, the
conduct of those who pay ransoms in response to threats against the hostage may be excused
by the duress defense. For more resources discussing the difficulties imposed by intent and
duress, see Kolb et al., supra note 24, at 145; Yvonne M. Dutton & Jon Bellish, Refusing to
Negotiate: Analyzing the Legality and Practicality of a Piracy Ransom Ban, 47 CORNELL INT’L
L.J. 299, 315–22 (2014) (applying criminal law’s retributive principles to those who make
payments in response to ransom demands, extortion threats, and bribes and concluding that
the defense of duress precludes liability in the first two categories).
31. S.C. Res. 1373, ¶ 1(d) (Sept. 28, 2001).
32. See discussion infra Sections I.B, I.C.
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members beginning with Resolution 1267 (1999). In the years since, both
the sanctions regime and the list of individuals to whom it applies33 have
been expanded and now contemplate funds conveyed in exchange for hos-
tages. However, no resolution explicitly designates ransom payments as a
form of terrorist financing or provides for their criminalization, signifying
that ransoms are not necessarily prohibited under international law. Fur-
thermore, both a higher tolerance of ransoms by the international commu-
nity and states’ evolving interpretations of their role in confronting
hostage situations indicate an emerging trend in that direction. Accord-
ingly, the following Section will review the most recent Security Council
resolutions to determine the status of ransom payments under the interna-
tional counterterrorism regime.
B. Implications of the Assets Freeze: Ransom as a Form
of Terrorist Financing?
In part to supplement the regime contemplated by the Terrorist Fi-
nancing Convention, the Security Council passed several resolutions be-
ginning in 1999 that impose sanctions against specific terror-sponsoring
entities and their affiliates (the Consolidated List).34 Issued under Chapter
VII of the U.N. Charter, each resolution carries binding authority and ap-
plies the Convention’s commitments against terrorist financing to al-Qaida
and the Taliban.35 One such commitment, aimed at the assets of both re-
gimes, was a mandate that states
[f]reeze without delay the funds and other financial assets or eco-
nomic resources of these individuals, groups, undertakings and en-
tities, including funds derived from property owned or controlled
directly or indirectly, by them or by persons acting on their behalf
or at their direction, and ensure that neither these nor any other
funds, financial assets or economic resources are made available,
directly or indirectly for such persons’ benefit, or by their nation-
als or by persons within their territory.36
33. Consolidated United Nations Security Council Sanctions List, (last updated Mar.
2, 2016) https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/sites/www.un.org.sc.suborg/files/consolidated.pdf.
34. See Kolb et al., supra note 24, at 151–54 for a brief history of the UN Sanctions
Regime established to target al-Qaida and the Taliban.
35. See ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, Sanctions List Materials,
U.N.S.C. (Mar. 28, 2016); Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999)
and 1989 (2911) Concerning Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities, https://www
.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/11267/aq_sanctions_list.
36. S.C. Res. 1822, ¶ 1(a) (June 30, 2008). Resolutions 1267, 1333, and 1390 collec-
tively established the list of individuals targeted by the assets freeze. Further resolutions peri-
odically extended the mandate of the Sanctions Committee to maintain that list; with each
extension, both the assets freeze and its application to listed entities were reaffirmed. For the
text of the original assets freeze implemented in 1999, see S.C. Res. 1267, ¶ 4(b) (Oct. 15,
1999).
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Reaffirmed in subsequent resolutions,37 the assets freeze is the primary
financial weapon against individuals on the Consolidated List and thus es-
tablishes a foundation for prohibiting funds transferred on hostages’ be-
half. However, the drafting history and delegates’ statements indicate that
ransoms were not a focal point of concern at the time of the adoption.
Instead, the purpose of the original assets freeze of Resolution 1267 (1999)
was to target members of the Taliban elite who were materially supporting
Osama bin Laden, while early adjustments expanded the scope of the
freeze to include members of al-Qaida and other “associated” individu-
als.38 Without further indication regarding the substance of the assets
freeze, its application to ransom payments remained tenuous during the
first decade of the sanctions regime.
Resolution 1904 (2009), adopted against a backdrop of increased ter-
ror- and piracy-driven kidnappings,39 resolved this ambiguity by confirm-
ing that the assets freeze measure “shall also apply to the payment of
ransoms to individuals, groups, undertakings or entities”40 on the Consoli-
dated List. Its provisions were approved unanimously under Chapter VII
of the U.N. Charter and are legally binding on states. The effect is to par-
tially fill the gaps of both the Terrorist Financing Convention and Resolu-
tion 1373: by specifically providing for ransoms as subject to the assets
freeze, it is possible to read 1904 as designating ransom payments as a
form of terrorist financing.41
Yet unlike Resolution 1373, Resolution 1904 falls short of requiring
states to enforce the prohibition through domestic criminal sanctions, indi-
cating a distinction between ransoms and other forms of terrorist financ-
ing. Instead, the two-pronged assets freeze extended by Resolution 1904
directs states to “freeze without delay” such payments and to ensure that
37. See S.C. Res. 1988, ¶ 1(a) (June 17, 2011); S.C. Res. 1989, ¶ 1(a) (June 17, 2011);
S.C. Res. 2082, ¶ 1(a) (Dec. 17, 2012); S.C. Res. 2083, ¶ 1(a) (Dec. 17, 2012); S.C. Res. 2160,
¶ 1(a) (June 17, 2014); S.C. Res. 2161, ¶ 1(a) (June 17, 2014).
38. Lisa Ginsborg, The United Nations Security Council’s Counter-terrorism Al-Qaida
Sanctions Regime: Resolution 1267 and the 1267 Committee, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TERRORISM 608, 609-10 (Ben Saul ed., 2014).
39. S.C. Res. 1904, at 1 (Dec. 17, 2009) (“Expressing concern at the increase in inci-
dents of kidnapping and hostage-taking by individuals, groups, undertakings and entities as-
sociated with Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden or the Taliban with the aim of raising funds, or
gaining political concessions.”). The passing of Resolution 1904 coincided with a parallel rise
of kidnappings in the piracy context, which was an issue of contention during Security Coun-
cil debates and may have contributed to the inclusion of ransom payments in Resolution
1904. See, e.g., U.N. SCOR, 64th Sess., 6221st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.6221, (Nov. 18, 2009)
(“[W]e are concerned that ransom payments have contributed to the recent increases in
piracy, and encourage all States to adopt a firm no-concessions policy when dealing with
hostage-takers, including pirates.”). For a discussion of Somali piracy kidnappings, which
were at their height between 2008-2011 and figured prominently in Security Council Resolu-
tions during that period, see generally Kolb et al., supra note 24.
40. S.C. Res. 1904, ¶ 5 (Dec. 17, 2009). This language was also incorporated into subse-
quent resolutions. See S.C. Res. 1988, ¶ 7 (June 17, 2011); S.C. Res. 1989, ¶ 8 (June 17, 2011);
S.C. Res. 2082, ¶ 6 (Dec. 17, 2012); S.C. Res. 2083, ¶ 6 (Dec. 17, 2012).
41. See Kolb et al., supra note 24, at 153-54.
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ransom funds are not “made available” for the benefit of persons on the
Consolidated List.42 In a statement explaining the terms of the assets
freeze, the al-Qaida Sanctions Committee identified the purpose of the
measure as “deny[ing] listed individuals, groups, undertakings and entities
the means to support terrorism,”43 suggesting an emphasis on the denial of
funds rather than the targeting of funders themselves.44 Moreover, the
broad scope of individuals encompassed by the assets freeze, together with
its application either before or pending criminal proceedings, demon-
strates the preventive rather than punitive purpose of the measure.45
More recently, the growth of organizations such as Daesh has
prompted a string of Security Council resolutions addressing ransom pay-
ments in greater detail. Resolution 2133 (2014), proposed by the United
Kingdom and unanimously adopted, was the first devoted to the question
of ransom payments to terrorist actors.46 Its provisions call upon states
firstly to “prevent terrorists from benefitting directly or indirectly from
ransom payments or from political concessions,” secondly, to “secure the
safe release of hostages,” and thirdly, to “encourage private sector part-
ners to adopt or follow relevant guidelines and good practices for prevent-
ing and responding to terrorist kidnappings without paying ransoms.”47
Resolution 2133 appears to be a step toward prohibiting ransoms, but
again falls short of imposing a punishable offense for the payment thereof.
The Resolution’s emphasis on denying the benefits of ransoms48 echoes
the obligation first articulated in Resolution 1904 of state intervention to
42. S.C. Res. 1904, ¶ 1(a) (Dec. 17, 2009).
43. See Al-Qaida Sanctions Comm., Assets Freeze: Explanation of Terms, ¶ 2 (Feb. 24,
2015), https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/sites/www.un.org.sc.suborg/files/eot_assets_freeze_-_en-
glish.pdf [hereinafter Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee].
44. This position seems to have attracted the support of the Group of Eight in 2013,
which issued a statement expressing its unequivocal rejection of ransom payments to ter-
rorists and interpreting the resolution to “require[ ] that Member States prevent the payment
of ransoms, directly or indirectly, to terrorists designated under the UN Al Qaeda sanctions
regime . . . .” G-8 Leaders Communique´, The Threat Posed by Kidnapping for Ransom by
Terrorists and the Preventive Steps the International Community Can Take, ¶ 76, (June 18,
2013), http://www.francophonie.org/IMG/pdf/lough_erne_2013_g8_leaders_communique.pdf
[hereinafter G-8 Communique´].
45. See Ilias Bantekas, The International Law on Terrorist Financing, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TERRORISM 132 (Ben Saul ed., 2014) (“Freezing
and confiscation aim to deter the use of assets for the perpetration of criminal offences by the
owner or other persons. Therefore, they are not forms of punishment, especially given that
freezing and confiscation can take place prior to the suspect’s criminal trial.”). This interpre-
tation is supported by the Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee’s clarification that, in conformity
with paragraph 31 of Resolution 2161, the assets freeze requirements are “preventative in
nature and are not reliant upon criminal standards set out under national law.” Al-Qaida
Sanctions Comm., supra note 43, ¶ 26.
46. Kidnap for Ransom: To Pay or Not to Pay?, ORG. FOR SEC. AND CO-OPERATION IN
EUR. (OSCE) (Dec. 1, 2014), http://www.osce.org/secretariat/128071.
47. S.C. Res. 2133, ¶¶ 3, 10 (Jan. 27, 2014). The resolution also calls for interstate
cooperation during hostage situations as well as further expert discussion within the United
Nations and among the relevant counter-terrorism bodies. Id. ¶¶ 4, 6, 11, 12.
48. See, e.g., id. ¶ 6.
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intercept funds.49 Moreover, the reference to prior resolutions 1904, 1989,
and 2083 to impose only the assets freeze rather than criminal sanctions
against financers themselves50 reiterates the Council’s distinction between
ransoms and terrorist financing. The Security Council can and has referred
to prior resolutions to impose older requirements onto new subjects;51 its
failure to mention the criminal sanctions of Resolution 1373 in this in-
stance confirms ransoms as falling outside the scope of the terrorist financ-
ing regime. Finally, the call upon states merely to “encourage” private
sector cooperation through “guidelines and good practices”52 detracts
from any previous interpretation of Resolution 1373 or its progeny as ex-
tending the criminal sanctions associated with terrorist-financing sanctions
to ransom financers. Instead, by encouraging participation among private
sector partners rather than mandating state control, the Security Council
preserves flexibility to engage in negotiations at the private level.
Further resolutions have addressed ransoms with greater specificity.
Resolutions 2160 and 2161 were passed in June 2014 to renew the assets
freeze and other measures targeting Taliban and al-Qaida associated enti-
ties on the Sanctions List.53 Both resolutions expand the range of ransoms
subject to the assets freeze, which applies to the “direct or indirect pay-
ment of ransoms to . . . entities on the List, regardless of how or by whom
the ransom is paid.”54 The inclusive language indicates a shift toward more
vigorous targeting of funds and may reflect concerns raised by growing
reports of hostages held by Daesh and other terrorist groups at that time.
However, as neither Resolution addresses the domestic criminalization or
permissibility of paying a ransom, it would appear that ransom financers
are still subject to only the general assets freeze rather than some broader-
reaching prohibition on the act itself.
49. The Argentinian delegate’s statement following the adoption of Resolution 2133
upholds this conclusion by rejecting any possibility that the resolution could undermine per-
missive payments for hostage release. See U.N. SCOR, 69th Sess., 7101st mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc.
S/PV.7101 (Jan. 27, 2014) (“[B]eyond not establishing new legal obligations for Members, the
resolution has the symbolic value of reflecting the Council’s unanimous agreement that dia-
logue should be initiated on ways of combating this particular form of financing for terror-
ism.”); see also Press Release, Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on
Kidnap for Ransom (June 23, 2014), http://www.gr2014.eu/sites/default/files/FAC%20Conclu
sion%205.pdf (welcoming the adoption of Resolution 2133 as reaffirming states’ “political
commitment” to “prevent terrorists from benefiting from ransom payments”).
50. See S.C. Res. 2133, at 2, (Jan. 27, 2014) (“Recalling its resolutions 1904 (2009),
1989 (2011) and 2083 (2012), which, inter alia, confirm that the requirements of operative
paragraph 1 (a) of these resolutions, also apply to the payment of ransoms to individuals,
groups, undertakings or entities on the Al-Qaida Sanctions List . . . .”).
51. See id. For a discussion of the Security Council’s treatment of prior resolutions
when reaffirming or recalling their provisions, see Michael C. Wood, The Interpretation of
Security Council Resolutions, 2 MAX PLANCK Y.B. OF U.N. L. 73, 87 (1998).
52. S.C. Res. 2133, ¶ 10 (Jan. 27, 2014).
53. S.C. Res. 2160, ¶ 1 (June 17, 2014); S.C. Res. 2161, ¶ 1 (June 17, 2014).
54. S.C. Res. 2160, ¶ 7 (June 17, 2014) (emphasis added).
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Resolution 2199 of February 2015 is perhaps most illuminating: it reaf-
firms the application of the assets freeze to Daesh,55 but ventures further
by distinguishing between ransoms and external donations and setting
forth different requirements for each.56 For the former, it repeats Resolu-
tion 2133’s call upon states to “prevent” terrorists from reaping the bene-
fits of kidnapping schemes and to “encourage” private sector participation
but, in keeping with prior resolutions, fails to address ransom financers
themselves.57 For external donations, however, the resolution mentions
states’ “obligation to ensure that their nationals and persons within their
territory do not make donations” to the designated entities.58 By highlight-
ing the obligatory nature of states’ duties toward donations but omitting to
do the same for ransoms, the Security Council creates a distinction be-
tween the two and implies a stricter approach to the former.59 The phras-
ing of the duty in the active voice reinforces this interpretation: the assets
freeze applicable to ransoms requires only that ransom funds not be
“made available” (avoiding discussion of ransom financers), whereas the
phrasing of operative provision 21 highlights the duty to confront not just
the availability of donations, but also the donors themselves.
The Security Council thus has constructed an increasingly restrictive
framework for addressing hostage situations, but stopped short of mandat-
ing a prohibition on the act of paying ransoms or specifying sanctions for
states that facilitate payments. All resolutions discussed within this Section
were passed unanimously and, with the exception of Resolution 2133,
under binding authority, indicating the Council’s authoritative consensus
on the measures adopted. A principled interpretation of their provisions
suggests that states are under an affirmative obligation to ensure that ran-
som funds do not reach their intended recipients, yet bear no duty to ap-
prehend, criminally or otherwise, ransom financers themselves. Instead,
the decision to subject such payments to only the assets freeze weighs
against a consideration of ransoms as a form of unlawful terrorist financ-
ing as defined by the Convention and prohibited under Resolution 1373.
Unfortunately, the resulting framework—denying the benefit of ransoms
but declining to prosecute those who provide them—renders the lawful-
ness of ransom payments unclear. The following Section will therefore ad-
dress the state practice and policies that have developed in the absence of
a clear legal standard.
55. S.C. Res. 2199, ¶ 19 (Feb. 12, 2015); see also S.C. Res. 2170 (Aug. 15, 2014).
56. See S.C. Res. 2199, ¶¶ 18-22 (Feb. 12, 2015).
57. Id. ¶¶ 19–20.
58. Id. ¶¶ 21–22 (emphasis added). This language originally appears in Resolution
2170, which addresses donations in less detail. See S.C. Res. 2170, ¶ 15 (Aug. 15, 2014).
59. This dichotomy may reflect an understanding of the differences of mens rea be-
tween donors, acting of their own volition and with the intent to finance terror, and those
who exchange funds for the humanitarian release of a hostage. It is unlikely, however, that
the measures stipulated for either ransoms or donors would be enforceable through domestic
criminal sanctions against individuals. See S.C. Res. 2199, ¶¶ 18–22 (Feb. 12, 2015); Al-Qaida
Sanctions Comm., supra note 43, ¶ 26.
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II. STATE PRACTICE: POLICY-ORIENTED APPROACHES
AND SHORTCOMINGS
In light of the uncertainty of the international legal framework gov-
erning ransom payments to terrorist non-state actors, two dominant do-
mestic approaches have emerged in response to hostage situations. The
no-concessions position, traditionally embraced by such countries as the
United States and the United Kingdom, rejects ransom payments as a per-
missible means of securing the freedom of hostages.60 Instead, this ap-
proach equates payments with the unlawful financing of terrorist
organizations as defined under the relevant international agreements and
emphasizes the propensity of ransoms to incentivize further kidnappings.
Conversely, the no-concessions theory justifies non-payment on grounds
of deterrence through suppression of funding and operational capacity.61
In its strictest form, this policy is instituted in both the public and private
domains, and the payment of ransoms by families or employers may be
criminalized to better achieve the goals of national policy.
At the opposite end of the spectrum are states that either (1) publicly
defend a permissive approach to ransom payments or (2) engage in or
otherwise permit unofficial negotiations for hostages’ release, notwith-
standing an official policy to the contrary. Defenders of a permissive ap-
proach envisage the state as fulfilling its fundamental duty to protect its
nationals, which, some argue, can be accomplished most securely through
the payment of ransoms.62 International human rights law is also some-
times relied upon to emphasize the hostages’ right to life, liberty, and se-
curity of person, and the prohibition on torture and cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment.63 Although the permissive approach may incentivize
future kidnapping operations, its proponents advocate for prioritizing the
immediate threat to the individual life of an identifiable hostage over the
more tenuous possibility of future attacks.64
The dominant positions are not easily reconciled. While the two poli-
cies may reflect competing considerations between counterterrorism strat-
egy and humanitarian values, states embracing either position are united
by common interests: preserving the life and welfare of victims, deterring
kidnapping schemes, and confronting and bringing perpetrators to justice.
Accordingly, a unilaterally executed ban on ransom payments that fails to
deter kidnappings of other nationals does not address the underlying issue;
similarly, a permissive approach to payments that other states have pro-
hibited would also fall short of addressing the broader problem. This Sec-
60. See infra Section II.A.
61. See infra Section II.A.
62. See infra Section II.B.
63. See infra notes 102–04 and accompanying text.
64. See Rivka Weill, Exodus: Structuring Redemption of Captives, 36 CARDOZO L.
REV. 177, 213–14 (2014) (discussing the psychological phenomenon whereby “people prefer
to save the life of a known single victim over the lives of a group, even if the individuals of
the group are identified”).
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tion will therefore analyze the strengths and shortcomings of each position
and suggest that a more nuanced approach is required to effectively con-
front hostage situations.
A. “Hard” Policy: No Concessions
At the forefront of the no-concessions policy approach, the United
States and the United Kingdom have traditionally been steadfast defend-
ers of ransom prohibitions as the long-term solution to the kidnapping di-
lemma.65 Until the change in policy announced by the Obama
administration in June 2015,66 the official U.S. policy following the Sep-
tember 11 terror attacks was “to deny hostage-takers the benefits of ran-
som, prisoner releases, policy changes, or other acts of concession,” but to
simultaneously exhaust every other remedy available to secure the release
of U.S. nationals.67 The United Kingdom similarly declares ransom pay-
ments to designated terrorist organizations to be illegal under interna-
tional law and in contravention of its domestic policy.68 Their policies
seem to reflect the predominant view of terrorist organizations as illegiti-
mate and unlawful actors, which is generally accompanied by a concern
that any attempt to negotiate might be perceived as indirectly condoning
the actions of the perpetrators.69 While many states may share this assess-
ment,70 several U.S. and U.K. officials ventured further and contemplated
criminal sanctions against ransom financers in an effort to implement the
ban at the domestic level.71
65. See, e.g., Bento, supra note 9, at 317–19.
66. In late 2014, President Obama ordered a comprehensive review of the existing
policy for terrorist-related kidnappings as a direct result of the “increased frequency of hos-
tage-taking of Americans overseas, and the recognition of the dynamic threat posed by spe-
cific terrorist groups.” Letter from Under Sec’y of Def. for Policy Christine E. Wormuth to
U.S. House Representative Duncan Hunter (Nov. 11, 2014), https://s3.amazonaws.com/
s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1363080/scan001-1.pdf; see also Statement by President
Obama on the U.S. Government’s Hostage Policy Review (June 24, 2015), https://www
.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/06/24/statement-president-us-governments-hostage-pol
icy-review.
67. Press Statement by Richard Boucher, U.S. Dep’t of State, International Terrorism:
American Hostages (Feb. 20, 2002), http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/8190.htm.
68. See, e.g., Home Office (U.K.), Factsheet: kidnap and ransom, Part of Counter-
Terrorism and Security Bill: factsheets (Dec. 3, 2014), https://www.gov.uk/government/up
loads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/382438/CTS_Bill_-_Factsheet_9_-_Kidnap_and_
Ransom.pdf.
69. See Bento, supra note 9, at 315.
70. Id.
71. See, e.g., Brian Ross, James Gordon Meek & Rhonda Schwartz, ‘So Little Compas-
sion’: James Foley’s Parents Say Officials Threatened Family Over Ransom, ABC NEWS
(Sept. 25, 2014), http://abcnews.go.com/International/government-threatened-foley-family-
ransom-payments-mother-slain/story?id=25453963 (discussing at least one U.S. official’s
statements to the Foley family regarding prosecution as a possible consequence for making a
ransom payment to Daesh); Counter-Terrorism and Security Act, 2015, c. 6, § 42 (U.K.) (cre-
ating a punishable offense for the reimbursement of ransom payments where the underlying
payment by the insured party is made to persons involved in or suspected of terrorist activi-
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Proponents of the no-concessions position argue that refusing to pay
ransoms deters kidnappings;72 recent data supports this hypothesis where
financial gains are the dominant considerations driving kidnapping opera-
tions.73 A recent investigation by the New York Times found that only
three of fifty-three hostages held by al-Qaida and its affiliates between
2009-2014 were American and that the majority of those kidnapped were
nationals of countries known to pay ransoms.74 Similar studies suggest that
other hostage-taking groups have consciously targeted nationals of states
that had paid ransoms in the past.75 Those promoting the no-concessions
position assert that, were more countries to adopt this policy approach, a
universal ban on negotiations with the offending organizations would in-
hibit not only the funding for future kidnapping operations, but also the
operational ability to carry out further acts of terrorism.76
In practice, the limited number of nations that adhere to the no-con-
cessions position translates into a much narrower impact on the operations
of terror groups. Instead of deterring kidnapping schemes or inhibiting
funding at a broad-reaching level, the prohibitions have merely shifted or-
ganizational efforts toward kidnapping nationals of countries that are
known to make payments.77 While the non-targeting of nationals may be
hailed as a domestic victory for no-concessions nations, the redirection of
kidnapping efforts toward foreign nationals accomplishes little toward de-
terrence of hostage situations on a broader scale. Moreover, critics point
out that even if all nations were to adopt a policy against ransom pay-
ments, the differential abilities of states to enforce a ransom prohibition
and monitor private parties78—who sometimes arrange payments without
ties). The United States has since disclaimed such a policy and has declared its intent not to
pursue criminal prosecutions. See infra note 162 and accompanying text.
72. See, e.g., David S. Cohen, U.S. Under Sec’y for Terrorism and Financial Intelli-
gence, Kidnapping for Ransom: The Growing Terrorist Financing Challenge 6 (Oct. 5, 2012)
(“Refusing to pay ransoms or to make other concessions to terrorists is, clearly, the surest
way to break the cycle, because if kidnappers consistently fail to get what they want, they will
have a strong incentive to stop taking hostages in the first place.”).
73. Rukmini Callimachi, Paying Ransoms, Europe Bankrolls Qaeda Terror, N.Y.
TIMES (July 29, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/30/world/africa/ransoming-citizens-
europe-becomes-al-qaedas-patron.html?_r=0.
74. See id. But see John W. Rollins & Liana Rosen, U.S. Citizens Kidnapped by the
Islamic State, Congressional Research Service Reports, Feb. 13, 2015, http://www.fas.org/sgp/
crs/terror/IN10167.pdf (reporting that at least 72 U.S. citizens have been kidnapped by ter-
rorist groups between 2005 and 2013).
75. See Cohen, supra note 72; Callimachi, supra note 73 (quoting Jean-Paul Rouiller,
director of Geneva Center for Training and Analysis of Terrorism: “[I]t’s obvious that Al
Qaeda is targeting [the hostages] by nationality . . . Hostages are an investment, and you are
not going to invest unless you are pretty sure of a payout.”).
76. See, e.g., G-8 Communique´, supra note 44, ¶¶ 75–81.
77. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 72 (discussing a general shift of hostage targeting to
Europeans rather than American or British citizens as a result of the U.S. and U.K. non-
payment policy).
78. See Dutton & Bellish, supra note 30, at 328.
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the knowledge or involvement of their governments—would render an ef-
fective ban nearly impossible to implement.
Moreover, there are considerable limitations on the ability to deter
kidnappings motivated in part or whole by political, rather than solely fi-
nancial, considerations. Unlike purely profit-driven kidnapping opera-
tions, hostage situations in the terrorism context are often characterized
by a higher degree of ideological or political demands that, if not met, may
result in the hostage’s prolonged detention or execution.79 Particularly
where a state’s national is kidnapped in retaliation against military inter-
vention, a non-payment policy is of little consequence. This was the case in
the string of kidnappings and executions across the Middle East during the
early 2000s; the beheadings of U.S. nationals in retaliation for prisoners
held at Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib demonstrate the degree to
which political purposes can influence the outcomes of hostage situa-
tions.80 More recently, the non-payment policies of the United States and
the United Kingdom failed to deter the kidnappings of Americans James
Foley, Steven Sotloff, and Abdul-Rahman Kassig and Britons David
Haines and Alan Henning. Although the latter hostages were killed fol-
lowing a series of political and financial demands,81 their deaths demon-
strate the limitations of a non-payment policy in deterring hostage
situations that arise in highly politicized circumstances.
The fate of the American and British hostages also demonstrates what
is perhaps the most disturbing shortcoming of the no-concessions stance in
its strictest form: its limited ability to address hostage situations that arise
notwithstanding the deterrence effect. For states equating a ban on con-
cessions with a ban on negotiations, any engagement with hostage-takers
risks undermining the state’s credibility and weakening their bargaining
positions.82 Absent an option to negotiate directly or through in-
termediaries, the remaining method of extraction is through military inter-
79. See Bento, supra note 9, at 303–04 (distinguishing between terrorism as a “form of
political and/or religious activism that uses violence in seeking to promote ideological or
religious beliefs and/or to obtain desired outcomes that are fundamentally based on or moti-
vated by such beliefs” and piracy as a crime of opportunity “that uses the threat of violence,
or in some cases violence per se, for private ends”).
80. See, e.g., U.S. Journalist Daniel Pearl Is Dead, Officials Confirm, CNN (Feb. 22,
2002), http://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/south/02/21/missing.reporter/; Sewell
Chan & Ariana Eunjung Cha, American Beheaded on Web Video: Militants Say Killing was
Revenge for U.S. Abuses at Iraqi Prison, WASH. POST (May 12, 2004), http://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A19048-2004May11.html; Niel Macfarquhar, Acting on
Threat, Saudi Group Kills Captive American, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2004), http://www.nytimes
.com/2004/06/19/world/acting-on-threat-saudi-group-kills-captive-american.html?ref=topics.
81. Mixed motives underlying kidnappings further complicate this analysis. See Rollins
& Rosen, supra note 74 (discussing Daesh’s operational inconsistencies and widely disparate
ransom demands as “raising questions regarding its fundraising motivations”); see also
Rukmini Callimachi, For James Foley’s Family, U.S. Policy Offered No Hope, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 15, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/16/us/for-hostages-family-us-policy-offered-
no-hope.html?_r=0 (detailing Daesh’s early political demands of Foley’s family before set-
tling on the figure of $130 million USD [originally _100 million EUR] as a ransom demand).
82. Weill, supra note 64, at 205–06.
732 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 37:717
vention. The rigidity of this approach renders it understandably less
appealing to states lacking the military capacity to execute such an opera-
tion or to those that would otherwise find such operations cripplingly bur-
densome.83 The executions of the American and British nationals by
Daesh following the ransomed release of fifteen others held in the same
group are widely cited as demarcating the consequences that can attach to
no-concessions policies.84
To mitigate the effects of non-payment, the United States and the
United Kingdom usually attempt, and have at times successfully executed,
military interventions to rescue hostages. Their approach is frequently ref-
erenced as another reason that kidnappers avoid American and British
nationals, as “the threat of military intervention without ransom payments
appears to be a disincentive for terrorists.”85 Notwithstanding some mea-
sure of success in achieving their objectives, rescue operations pose signifi-
cant risks to both rescuers and hostages and may be associated with a high
rate of failure.86 Particularly where hostages of ransom-paying and non-
ransom-paying states are held together, one country’s decision to inter-
vene by force may subject all hostages to the military risks following from
that decision.87 The recent deaths of two hostages held by Daesh—one
American and one South African—during an attempted rescue opera-
tion88 demonstrate the danger that, in situations involving hostages of dif-
ferent nationalities, “the citizens of multiple countries could suffer as a
result of one country’s ban on ransom payments.”89
In conclusion, the no-concessions stance has only a limited ability at
best to address kidnapping operations in the terrorism context. While the
policies currently in place may sometimes deter the taking of American or
British hostages, a non-universal ban merely redirects kidnappers’ efforts
83. See discussion infra Sections II.B, III.A.
84. See Callimachi, supra note 4; Karen Yourish, The Fates of 23 ISIS Hostages in
Syria, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/10/24/world/middleeast/the-fate-
of-23-hostages-in-syria.html (last updated Feb. 10, 2015) (detailing the differences of out-
come among hostages held by Daesh according to nationality).
85. CENTER FOR SECURITY STUDIES (CSS), Kidnapping for Ransom as a Source of
Terrorism Funding, No. 141 in CSS ANALYSIS IN SECURITY POLICY, 4 (2013).
86. See, e.g., David Martin & Debora Patta, U.S.-Led Hostage Rescues Rarely Success-
ful, Always Dangerous, CBS NEWS AP (Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/u-s-led-
hostage-rescues-rarely-successful-always-dangerous/; Rahul Radhakrishnan, A Brief History
of Failed US Rescue Bids, AL JAZEERA (Dec. 6, 2014), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/ameri-
cas/2014/12/brief-history-failed-us-rescue-bids-2014126155330464788.html.
87. Dutton & Bellish, supra note 30, at 324.
88. See, e.g., Kareem Fahim & Eric Schmitt, 2 Hostages Killed in Yemen as U.S. Rescue
Effort Fails, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/07/world/mid-
dleeast/hostage-luke-somers-is-killed-in-yemen-during-rescue-attempt-american-official-says
.html. Exacerbating the situation was evidence that the South African hostage was to be
released the next day, as his ransom had already been negotiated and a convoy deployed to
secure his release. See Rukmini Callimachi, At 6, Awaiting Hostage’s Release. After 8, Learn-
ing That He’s Dead, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/08/world/
middleeast/hostage-nearly-free-on-ransom-killed-during-seal-raid.html.
89. See Dutton & Bellish, supra note 30, at 324.
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toward other states’ nationals and does not prevent kidnappings or inhibit
funding at a broader level.90 A ransom prohibition may have even less
impact where hostages are taken for political rather than purely financial
purposes. Finally, given the risks of military interventions and the unlikeli-
hood of unanimous collaboration in implementing a prohibition, a unilat-
eral ban poses a real threat to hostages taken without providing a
corresponding benefit of deterrence.
B. “Soft” Policy: A Permissive Approach, or Concealing Concessions?
The second category can generally be described as comprising states
that (1) engage in ransom negotiations at the official level or (2) preserve
the ability of individuals or corporations to do so in the private sphere.91
This position has been attributed to France,92 Spain,93 Italy,94 Switzer-
land,95 Israel,96 and others. Far from openly defending such practices,
many states in this category publicly endorse and claim to implement the
no-concessions stance articulated in the Group of Eight communique´ of
2013.97 Yet evidence of communications through intermediaries and, in
some instances, the release of hostages in exchange for payments98 indi-
cates that the no-concessions standard is not uniformly implemented and,
more fundamentally, that it may not represent all states’ views.
Because many states in this category do not seek to justify or even
publicize ransoms paid, their underlying policy positions are sometimes
difficult to substantiate. Defenders of a permissive policy often portray the
state as undertaking the more humanitarian approach to hostage situa-
tions, which, they argue, may be more effectively confronted through ne-
gotiations.99 This stance is often reinforced by domestic pressure in favor
of such a response: where a victim’s family garners substantial support and
sympathy, democratically elected officials may be especially sensitive to
90. See id. at 322–28 for a discussion of the impracticalities of a unilateral ransom ban
in the piracy context and its inability to deter future criminal acts absent universal
commitment.
91. A third category comprises states that endorse the no-concessions standard but
lack the resources to fully monitor its implementation at the private level. Discussion of this
category is beyond the scope of this section, but see infra Section III.A for further discussion
of the proper role of states in conflict resolution.
92. See, e.g., Callimachi, supra note 73; Ellen Knickmeyer, Al Qaeda-Linked Groups
Increasingly Funded by Ransom, WALL ST. J. (July 29, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
ransom-fills-terrorist-coffers-1406637010.
93. Callimachi, supra note 73.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See Weill, supra note 64, at 190.
97. G-8 Communique´, supra note 44, ¶ 6 (“We unequivocally reject the payment of
ransoms to terrorists and call on countries and companies around the world to follow our
lead and to stamp this out as well as other lucrative sources of income for terrorists.”).
98. See Callimachi, supra note 73.
99. See Bento, supra note 9, at 311, 325–26.
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powerful political pressure on the victim’s behalf.100 The resulting domes-
tic consensus in favor of negotiating for a hostage’s release may overcome
international pressure to the contrary and lead states to engage in or oth-
erwise allow covert negotiations notwithstanding a strict non-payment
policy.101
Relatedly, a no-ransom policy that results in the deaths of nationals
may be construed as a violation of the state’s core duty to protect under
international human rights law. In its most rigid form of implementation, a
complete prohibition at both the public and private level might violate the
hostage’s right to life and freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment as enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights and other relevant instruments.102 As the primary
duty-holder under international law, the state’s responsibilities toward its
citizens might be conceptually extended to require the state to confront,
where possible, a group holding its citizens as hostages, or to permit others
to do so in its place.103 Thus by preserving the ability to engage kidnappers
through negotiations at the public or private level, states maintain a space
for these transactions to occur while fulfilling their own international legal
obligations.104
Proponents of the permissive approach also cite a higher level of se-
curity and likelihood of success relative to the no-concessions strategy of
military intervention.105 While rescue operations have achieved hostage
extraction on many occasions, the dangers such operations pose to rescu-
ers and hostages weigh heavily against this option as an alternative to ne-
gotiations.106 Moreover, the domestic political barriers that sometimes
impede states’ abilities to stage military interventions might render ran-
som payments a practical alternative.107 Even for those that do wield
strong military capabilities, an inquiry into the financial costs and risks
100. See, e.g., Weill, supra note 64, at 188–90.
101. See Bento, supra note 9, at 323; see also Weill, supra note 64, at 188–92 (discussing
victims’ families as a powerful source of political pressure during the negotiations process).
102. See Bento, supra note 9, at 311–12; International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights arts. 6-7, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 95–20, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
103. See Sofia Galani, Are Hostages Victims of the ‘War on Terror’ or ‘Victims of Doc-
trine’? Constitutional Responses to the Gaps of the Human Rights Protections of Hostages
18 (unpublished note), https://www.jus.uio.no/english/research/news-and-events/events/con-
ferences/2014/wccl-cmdc/wccl/papers/ws1/w1-galani.pdf for a discussion of the current sys-
tem’s shortcomings in addressing the human rights of hostages held by non-state actors.
104. A complete prohibition on ransoms might also interfere with states’ ability to ful-
fill domestic legal obligations. See Weill, supra note 64, at 208 for a discussion of states whose
constitutions would mandate involvement in the case of a kidnapping, even by a non-state
perpetrator, and for a discussion of the Colombian Supreme Court’s invalidation of a law
banning ransoms on the grounds that it would deny the hostage’s constitutional rights.
105. See id. at 185.
106. See supra notes 85–89 and accompanying text.
107. See CENTER FOR SECURITY STUDIES (CSS), supra note 85.
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associated with each option reinforces ransom payments as the more feasi-
ble strategy.
An additional concern relates to the lawfulness of military interven-
tions and the political strain they exert on the countries involved. The per-
missiveness of rescue operations staged with both knowledge and
cooperation of the territorial state is generally accepted;108 in contrast,
covert operations undertaken without host state consent raise both legal
and political concerns. Some states advocate a permissive approach to mil-
itary intervention where the host state is “unwilling or unable” to confront
the threat emanating from within its borders.109 However, the U.N. Char-
ter expressly prohibits the use of force absent sanctions by the Security
Council or an armed attack justifying the use of self-defense,110 and the
lawfulness of such operations under customary international law is far
from settled.111 Unless the hostage rescue attempt can be construed as an
act of self-defense under the Charter,112 the lawfulness of such an opera-
tion may still be rigorously contested. Finally, whatever the legal doctrine,
states are also sensitive to the political consequences that attach to mili-
tary interventions: where an operation might contribute to regional insta-
bility or escalate into an interstate conflict, government officials may be
inclined to negotiate a ransom rather than risk broader political
repercussions.
At the same time, the strongest criticism of the permissive approach to
ransom payments centers on its ability to subsidize terror.113 Each success-
ful transaction incentivizes further operations as ransom payments gener-
ate revenue that may be reinvested for future kidnapping endeavors.114
Successive payments may generate a market price, which would allow ter-
rorist organizations to measure the prices governments are willing to pay
for hostages and to increase their ransom demand figures.115 More funda-
mentally, payments may fund other terrorist activities and thus pose risks
toward not only potential kidnapping victims, but also the targets of ter-
rorism on a broader scale. The dilemma, as articulated by one government
official, is shared by governments, employers, and families of hostages
alike: “Not to pay ransoms . . . is to jeopardize innocent lives. But to pay
108. See, e.g., Mathias Forteau, Rescuing Nationals Abroad, in THE OXFORD HAND-
BOOK OF THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 952 (Marc Weller et al. eds., 2015).
109. See, e.g., Andrew W.R. Thomson, Doctrine of the Protection of Nationals Abroad:
Rise of the Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation, 11 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 627,
663 (2012); Tom Ruys, The ‘Protection of Nationals’ Doctrine Revisited, 13 J. CONFLICT &
SEC. L. 233, 249 (2008).
110. U.N. Charter arts. 2(4), 42, 51.
111. See infra text accompanying notes 137–43.
112. Id.
113. See Callimachi, supra note 73.
114. Cohen, supra note 72, at 5.
115. See Weill, supra note 64, at 211.
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ransoms is to help sustain terrorist groups that are dedicated to taking
many other innocent lives.”116
An additional criticism is leveled at the shortcomings of a permissive
approach in safeguarding the interests of the private sector. Because many
states in this category do not publicize or defend their policies,117 the lack
of official procedure may translate into a lack of legal clarity for private
actors—families, insurers, and other interested parties—involved in the
negotiations process. Although some states do coordinate with private
parties for the release of hostages, states that permit but do not themselves
engage in hostage negotiations submit their private-sector parties to the
same legal risks as those in non-concessions states.118 Ultimately, the com-
bination of an increasingly restrictive international regime against ransom
payments and domestic permissive policies in favor of them translates into
a lack of sufficient guidance to private entities regarding the legality of
their acts. Although binding Security Council resolutions are generally
only applicable against states rather than corporations or individuals,119
insurers or private entities working with intermediaries may be subject to
the domestic laws of other states which prohibit such transactions.
C. Bridging the Gap: A Deep Divide
As it currently stands, both approaches to hostage situations are
overly simplistic as applied to the broader, multifaceted problem that non-
state terrorist actors pose to the international community. While the no-
concessions approach does not in itself further terrorist activities, neither
does it deter political kidnappings or terrorist operations on a broader
level. By contrast, a permissive approach to ransoms may be more effec-
tive in securing the safe return of hostages, but it directly contributes to
terrorist activities and creates incentives for further kidnapping opera-
tions. The deep divide between two policy approaches gives rise to “a col-
lective action problem where refusing to negotiate may be in the interests
of the world community as a whole, but paying a ransom may be in the
interest of some states or individuals.”120
In addressing this problem, a necessary first step requires that states
rather than private-sector entities take the lead in confronting hostage sit-
uations, which are often effectively delegated to the private sector. Rather
than instituting a national prohibition on ransom payments or leaving the
private sector to address kidnappings which it lacks meaningful resources
to confront, this Section will argue that states should take a more active
116. Cohen, supra note 72, at 7.
117. See Callimachi, supra note 73.
118. States that prohibit ransoms or do not themselves engage in negotiations effec-
tively leave the private sector and/or family members to their own devices in navigating the
negotiations process. See, e.g., Callimachi, supra note 81; Callimachi, supra note 88.
119. See BRUNO SIMMA ET AL., THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMEN-
TARY 800–03 (3d ed. 2013) (detailing the limited circumstances under which Security Council
resolutions have been directed at non-state actors, including individuals).
120. Dutton & Bellish, supra note 30, at 324.
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role to arrive at a more coherent and coordinated approach. The following
analysis will therefore address the interests of the state in taking the lead
on hostage situations as well as the options available to states considering
negotiations as an alternative to military interventions.
III. THE WAY FORWARD
A necessary first step toward developing a multilateral approach to
international kidnappings for ransom is for states to take the lead from
private actors in addressing hostage situations within their domestic
spheres. A state-centered model holds substantial implications for private-
sector entities, whose interests are many times overlooked. At one end of
the current spectrum, states that institute a complete ban on negotiations
may leave victims’ families, employers, and insurers to fend for themselves
while risking exposure to criminal sanctions. On the opposite end, states
permitting or ignoring private-sector negotiations effectively delegate the
burden of protective responsibility to non-state actors. In both instances, a
lack of state responsibility at the national level leads the private sector to
take up a position that it is not only ill-equipped to fill, but which in some
instances may be illegal to pursue.
Accordingly, this Section will argue for a state-centered model which
shifts primary responsibility for responding to kidnapping incidents to the
state while preserving the collaborative capabilities of families and private
actors. As a key component of strategy, this Section will also argue that
while coordinated state action, including a collaborative military response,
should be the preferred modus operandi, the ability to negotiate should
remain a permissible alternative to military action.
A. State-centered Model: Responsibility-Shifting to the States
States have a particularly strong interest in taking the lead to address
hostage situations given the political and ideological motivations under-
pinning terrorist kidnappings. Because terrorist-designated groups em-
brace extremist ideologies that undermine international security,
kidnapping operations in furtherance of those ideologies are best ad-
dressed through the coordinated response of governments rather than pri-
vate actors.121 This shifting of responsibility to the states accounts for
national interests in confronting the broader issue of terrorism and recog-
nizes that “the decision to undertake high-risk rescue operations is within
the domain and, therefore, the responsibility of the political leader-
ship.”122 Similarly, by placing the option to negotiate solely within the
state’s domain, a state-centered model would also mitigate the risk of
working at cross purposes with the private sector, as may occur when, for
121. See J. PAUL DE B. TAILLON, HIJACKING AND HOSTAGES: GOVERNMENT RE-
SPONSES TO TERRORISM 159 (2002) (describing key elements associated with successful hos-
tage rescues).
122. Id.
738 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 37:717
example, a private actor facilitates a ransom payment to the very entity
whose funding the state endeavors to suppress.
Relatedly, kidnapping operations carried out by terrorist-designated
groups often entail an international dimension more aptly addressed by
states than individuals or other private entities. Where intergovernmental
communications are necessary for intelligence-sharing and military coop-
eration,123 states are uniquely positioned to confront such threats. The
dangers of delegating this role to the private sector are perhaps best illus-
trated through reference to the attempted rescue and simultaneous ran-
som of U.S. citizen Luke Somers and South African Pierre Korkie, both
held by al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen. There,
South Africa upheld its ransom prohibition and refrained from officially
engaging in negotiations; instead, an African NGO reached an agreement
on a ransom amount for Korkie’s release.124 Unaware of the covert U.S.
operation to rescue Somers, the NGO had already sent a convoy to com-
plete the transaction; when AQAP militants noted the approaching U.S.
rescue team instead of the South African convoy, they shot and killed both
hostages.125
Moreover, a state-centered model accounts for states that cannot
themselves engage in military interventions, a situation which can only be
addressed through multilateral action. The G8 declaration pledge of mu-
tual assistance supports this point126 and reflects Japan’s quandary in early
2015: barred by its constitution from exercising military action and faced
with a ransom demand of $200 million for two Japanese hostages,127 Japan
first called upon leaders of Jordan, Turkey, and Egypt to assist in negotia-
tion.128 Prime Minister Shinzo Abe then coordinated with Jordanian offi-
cials to attempt a hostage exchange through the latter’s release of
captured Iraqi militant Sajida al-Rishawi.129 Japan is not the only state
123. See id. at 161–66 for a discussion of the importance of intelligence in staging a
hostage rescue operation.
124. The NGO had already secured the release of Yolande Korkie, held with her hus-
band for over seven months. For further details regarding Pierre Korkie’s planned release,
which was scheduled for the same day as the U.S. rescue of Luke Somers, see Callimachi,
supra note 88; Fahim & Schmitt, supra note 88.
125. Callimachi, supra note 88.
126. G-8 Communique´, supra note 44, ¶ 79 (“[W]hen the worst happens, we agree to
provide mutual assistance to States responding to terrorist kidnaps including, as appropriate
and feasible, through information sharing and specialist expertise or assistance, or the provi-
sion of resources related to hostage rescue.”).
127. Japan Outraged at IS ‘Beheading’ of Hostage Kenji Goto, BBC (Feb. 1 2015), http:/
/www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-31075769.
128. A Timeline of Japan’s Islamic State Hostage Crisis, JAPAN TIMES (Jan. 28, 2015),
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/01/28/national/timeline-japans-islamic-state-hostage-
crisis/#.VjOPYGSrS2w [hereinafter A Timeline of Japan’s Crisis].
129. The attempt was ultimately unsuccessful and both Japanese hostages were exe-
cuted. Japan, facing a 72-hour ransom deadline, requested the assistance of Jordan, Turkey,
and Egypt in negotiating for the release of its nationals. The deadline passed with no indica-
tion of whether Japan had made payment; two days later, in a video of what appeared to be
hostage Kenji Goto holding the decapitated head of fellow hostage Haruna Yukawa, Daesh
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that lacks an option to stage a rescue operation; countries such as Panama,
Costa Rica, Iceland, and others who either lack militaries or whose consti-
tutions prohibit them from having one, share Japan’s predicament. Hence,
the need to not only share relevant information but also coordinate mili-
tary cooperation upholds the utility of a state-centered model.
The corresponding inability of private actors not only to engage ter-
rorists militarily but also to maneuver the communications process weighs
in favor of states taking the role of facilitators. Where even establishing
communications ties is prohibited, as it was, for example, under the older
U.S. regime, families may be left disconnected from the political process
and yet unable to pursue their own strategies for hostage relief. The frus-
trations of the Foley family,130 whose complaints regarding their treatment
by U.S. officials garnered public attention and eventually led to a substan-
tial change in policy, serve as a pertinent example of the obstacles families
of hostages may face. Likewise, in states imposing criminal sanctions, pri-
vate actors face an additional risk of prosecution if they facilitate pay-
ments to listed organizations.131 Insurers are a particularly vulnerable
group in this last category; whatever the dictates of domestic law, the issue
of whether ransoms violate Security Council resolutions has led to uncer-
tainty as to the lawfulness of pro-payment policies.
The current policies of the United States and certain European na-
tions may serve as a useful model for facilitating public-private coopera-
tion. In the former case, the presidential order to review a decade’s worth
of restrictive ransom policies132 led to substantive changes that hearken
back to the pre-9/11 era.133 Like the framework of the 1990s and early
demanded the release of Iraqi failed-bomber Sajida al-Rishawi, captured by Jordan in 2005,
within 24 hours in exchange for Japan’s remaining hostage. Japan requested Jordan’s assis-
tance, but at that time, Daesh also held Jordanian pilot Moaz al-Kasasbeh, the release of
whom Jordan hoped to secure. Hence, Jordan was faced with the option of exchanging al-
Rishawi for the release of the Japanese hostage but not for the Jordanian pilot. In Japan and
Jordan’s failure to reach an agreement, Japan’s deadline passed and Goto was executed. No
further ransom demand was made for the Jordanian pilot before his execution in January
2015. In retaliation, Jordan, which had prohibited the death penalty in 2006, lifted its morato-
rium and executed al-Rishawi immediately thereafter. For further details on this sequence of
events, see A Timeline of Japan’s Crisis, supra note 128; Jason Hanna & Greg Botelho, ISIS
Claims It’s Beheaded One Japanese Hostage, Offers a Swap for the Other, CNN (Jan. 24, 2015,
11:19 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/24/world/isis-japan-hostages/; Japan Outraged at IS
‘Beheading’ of Hostage Kenji Goto, supra note 127; Ray Sanchez, Who Was Sajida al-
Rishawi? And Why Did ISIS Care About Her?, CNN (Feb. 4, 2015, 8:12 AM), http://www.cnn
.com/2015/01/24/world/isis-jordan-sajida-al-rishawi/.
130. See Callimachi, supra note 81.
131. Id.
132. See Michelle Kosinski, Obama Seeks Review of Government Response to Hostage-
Taking, CNN (Nov. 18, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/17/politics/obama-hostages-re-
view/.
133. See infra Section III.B. In those times, government officials reportedly engaged in
negotiations where the process promised to yield valuable intelligence that could be used to
prevent further terrorist activities. See Shane Harris, ‘No One’s Really in Charge’ in Hostage
Negotiations, FOREIGN POL’Y (Oct. 9, 2014), http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/10/09/no-ones-re-
ally-in-charge-in-hostage-negotiations/. The shift in policy, which occurred during the mid-
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2000s, the federal policies enacted now similarly allow for collaboration
between the state and family members and even establish an inter-depart-
mental action committee to facilitate the process.134 As of this writing, the
practicalities of the program are still in the development stage;135 as a fu-
ture model, however, the structure holds promising potential.
In sum, it is only once states adopt this role within their respective
domestic spheres that they may begin to coordinate a multilateral ap-
proach to hostage situations and terrorism more broadly. A key element
of the state-centered approach will likely center on ransoms as an alterna-
tive to military action; accordingly, the following Section will address the
legitimacy of ransoms as a permissive approach to kidnappings.
B. Ransom or Rescue?
Once states have taken up their proper roles, the question remains as
to whether and to what extent ransoms remain a legitimate strategy to
pursue. To the extent that state practice indicates an increasing tolerance
for negotiating for hostage release,136 this Section will argue that the op-
tion to facilitate ransoms should be preserved as a permissible alternative
to military action.
A preliminary matter relates to the lawfulness of military rescue oper-
ations under international law. Governed by the “protection of nationals”
doctrine,137 the legality of such operations is far from settled.138 Perhaps
the strongest argument in favor of the permissiveness of military action
would be that such action constitutes an exercise of self-defense under Ar-
ticle 51 of the U.N. Charter,139 which provides for the “inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a
to-late 2000’s, led to not only a general refusal to pay ransoms, but a more fundamental
refrainment from even communicating with kidnappers or, in some instances, intermediaries.
See Rukmini Callimachi, The Cost of the U.S. Ban on Paying for Hostages, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
27, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/28/world/middleeast/the-cost-of-the-us-ban-on-
paying-for-hostages.html?_r=0.
134. See infra Section III.B.
135. See Exec. Order No. 13,698, 3 C.F.R. § 5 (2015) [hereinafter E.O. 13,698] (pre-
scribing a six-month period for a status report assessing the establishment of the policy
provisions).
136. This Section does not purport to argue that ransoms are a permissible response to
kidnappings under customary international law, but rather acknowledges that such a norm
would likely fail for lack of the requisite opinio juris. See infra note 151 and accompanying
text.
137. See Ruys, supra note 109, at 234 (defining “protection of nationals” as “a concept
that refers to the conducting of a military intervention in the territory of a third state aimed
at the protection and/or rescuing of threatened nationals of the intervening state”).
138. See id. at 234–38.
139. Kristen E. Eichensehr, Note, Defending Nationals Abroad: Assessing the Lawful-
ness of Forcible Hostage Rescues, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 451, 461–63 (2008) (endorsing the right
of self-defense over the concept of humanitarian intervention as the proper legal basis for the
ability of the state to rescue nationals held overseas); but see Ruys, supra note 109, at 235
(introducing an alternative argument that, far from constituting an exercise of self-defense,
rescue operations do not even reach the threshold of the use of force prohibited under Arti-
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Member of the United Nations.”140 Where kidnappings amount to proxy
attacks on the hostage’s state of nationality, proponents argue, the re-
quirement that there be an “armed attack” may be satisfied such that the
state is justified in defending itself within the limitations prescribed by the
Charter.141 Ultimately, however, the potential for the doctrine’s abuse has
remained a barrier to its recognition,142 and the widespread resistance to
such an ILC provision on diplomatic protection during the U.N. General
Assembly’s 2000 debates has been cited as sufficient evidence of opinio
juris to counterbalance any state practice to the contrary.143
Yet, in practice, it may be that international tolerance for a more lim-
ited version of rescue missions justifies this strategy in certain instances.
To support such a view, scholars have pointed to operations focusing nar-
rowly on the rescue and evacuation of nationals as distinguished from any
further attempt to influence the injuring state’s domestic affairs.144 As a
doctrinal matter, rescue operations in the first category may comprise a
subset of the “protection of nationals” doctrine;145 this may be especially
so where the operation is limited to extracting hostages from non-state
operatives who either vie with the state for control of the territory or
thrive in the absence of an effective state government.146 States’ reactions
to such operations have ranged from mild to supportive,147 indicating a
tentative tolerance for limited intervention. In contrast, the fierce backlash
against states engaging in more involved rescue operations has been pri-
marily aimed at “those rescue missions where the territorial State objects
to the intervention or where the protection of nationals was just a pretext
for an invasion with wider objectives.”148 It is this latter category of opera-
cle 2(4) on the basis that such operations do not violate the “territorial integrity or political
independence” of the injuring state).
140. U.N. Charter art. 51.
141. See Eichensehr, supra note 139, at 468–69 (“[I]t is possible that harm to a state’s
citizens could reach the level of armed attack: ‘there may be occasions when the threat of
danger is great enough, or wide enough in its application to a sizable community abroad, for
it to be legitimately construed as an attack on the state itself.’”). This prong is arguably met
when, as occurred in the case of Daesh, kidnappers emphasized the nationalities of certain
hostages taken as symbols of their countries. Among the limitations to the right of self-de-
fense, however, the necessity requirement would likely be the more difficult to satisfy. The
principle of necessity requires a “lack of non-forceful options for preventing harm to the
hostages” and would be difficult to establish if engagement in negotiations is preserved as an
alternative.
142. See, e.g., id. at 464, 477.
143. See Ruys, supra note 109, at 256–59, 270.
144. See id. at 262–63, 263 n.187.
145. Id.
146. For a discussion of the doctrine’s application to non-state hostage-takers, see id. at
263, 265, 266, 268.
147. See id. at 262–63, 263 n.187.
148. Id. at 263 n.187 (quoting CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF
FORCE 129 (2d ed. 2004)).
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tions that is sometimes accused of undermining the legitimacy of the “pro-
tection of nationals” doctrine.
Even if the legal doctrine governing rescue operations is unclear,
states’ more recent responses to hostage situations demonstrate an in-
creasing preference for ransoms over rescues. Notwithstanding what was
formerly a widespread condemnation of states accused of facilitating pay-
ments,149 some governments’ recent retreat from ransom bans may high-
light a shift in strategy.150 This position, adopted by such states as Spain,
Australia, France, Italy, and others indicates a willingness, at least in the
West, to consider the alternative of ransom negotiations. As states fre-
quently faced with kidnappings, their actions constitute meaningful state
practice in favor of the permissibility of such payments.151 Even the
United States, formerly among the most vocal critics of ransom payments
to terrorist actors, seems to have displayed a retreat from its former
hardline position by establishing inter-departmental bodies to supervise
hostage recovery efforts.152
This shift in strategy lays the groundwork for recognizing (even if not
officially sanctioning)153 an option to negotiate in response to kidnapping
situations. The Security Council resolutions discussed earlier call for in-
creased cooperation among states to confront such situations;154 however,
negotiated release should remain a permissible alternative in the event
that such cooperation proves elusive. This option would account for the
inability of some states to partake in military operations, which weighs
against rescue missions as the only permissible response to hostage situa-
tions.155 Instead, states should retain the ability to engage kidnappers in
dialogue, with the possibility to undertake ransom negotiations on a case-
by-case basis, as an alternative to forcible rescue. Such an option would
149. See supra Section II.B.
150. Callimachi, supra note 73.
151. However, it remains doubtful that the requisite opinio juris is established (as re-
quired for the development of a norm of customary international law) given many states’
denial of facilitating ransom payments when accused of having done so. See, e.g., Callimachi,
supra note 73. It is also important to note the reactions of other stake-holding states, even if
their own nationals may not face such kidnappings. This is particularly true for the states in
which hostage-takers operate: their opposition to ransoms on the grounds that such payments
strengthen terrorist groups weighs heavily against the emergence of a permissive norm. See,
e.g., African Union [AU], Decision to Combat the Payment of Ransom to Terrorist Groups,
¶¶ 2, 8-9, Thirteenth Ordinary Session, Assembly/AU/Dec.256(XIII) (July 3, 2009) (expres-
sing its consideration of ransom payments as a form of terrorist financing); HRC Report,
supra note 18, ¶¶ 27-35 (detailing the impact of ransom payments on the local communities
in which terrorist hostage-takers operate).
152. See E.O. 13,698, supra note 135 (establishing the Hostage Recovery Fusion Cell,
the Hostage Response Group, and the Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs).
153. See infra note 171.
154. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2133, ¶¶ 4, 11 (Jan. 27, 2014).
155. As discussed in Section III.A, the prohibition of some states from holding militar-
ies would preclude them from engaging in rescue operations absent multilateral action; for
states in this category, a ransom prohibition would prevent them from addressing hostage
situations altogether. See supra notes 126–29 and accompanying text.
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preserve the ability of states to gather information about their opponents
through the negotiations process and would uphold the fundamental inter-
est in protecting their nationals against threats.156
As a practical matter, the structural changes implemented in the
United States’ hostage strategy in response to Executive Order 13698
(2015) may prove a promising model for other states considering a permis-
sive approach. The changes account for various issues raised in previous
Sections: firstly, the establishment of a permanent and interdepartmental
body to respond to hostage-takings ensures a streamlined rather than ad
hoc involvement by the state.157 The Order also provides for increased
coordination with hostage families158 and private-sector parties,159 as well
as enhanced transparency through proactive declassification of hostage-
related information.160 Finally, the establishment of a special envoy to co-
ordinate diplomatic engagements on hostage-related matters demonstrates
a commitment to interstate cooperation.161 In a statement released the
same day, the Department of Justice confirmed that it had never prose-
cuted a ransom financer and expressed its intent to refrain from doing
so.162
It is important to note, however, that the changes in U.S. strategy do
not officially detract from its policy against concessions;163 instead, the de-
cision not to prosecute those accused of paying ransoms merely mitigates
the risk facing family members for making such concessions. While this
distinction preserves the option of negotiating at the private level, the abil-
ity to do so at the governmental level will depend on the interpretation of
a key provision in the Presidential Policy Directive. The provision, which
specifies that the no-concessions policy “does not preclude engaging in
communications with hostage-takers,”164 diverges from the developed
156. See infra notes 166–70 and accompanying text.
157. E.O. 13,698, supra note 135, § 2 (establishing the Hostage Recovery Fusion Cell).
158. Id. § 2(c) (providing for a Family Engagement Coordinator).
159. Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-30: Hostage Recovery Activities (June 24, 2015),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/06/24/presidential-policy-directive-hostage-
recovery-activities (providing for coordination with private entities to “locate and recover
Americans held hostage abroad”).
160. E.O. 13,698, supra note 135, § 2 (d)(iv); see also Presidential Policy Directive 30,
supra note 159.
161. E.O. 13,698, supra note 135, § 4 (establishing the Special Presidential Envoy for
Hostage Affairs).
162. Dep’t of Justice Office of Public Affairs, Statement on U.S. Citizens Taken Hos-
tage Abroad (June 24, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-statement-
us-citizens-taken-hostage-abroad; see also Press Release, Statement by the President on the
U.S. Government’s Hostage Policy Review (June 24, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2015/06/24/statement-president-us-governments-hostage-policy-review.
163. Presidential Policy Directive 30, supra note 159.
164. Id. (authorizing dialogue with hostage-takers and intermediaries in order to assist
private efforts or secure the hostage’s release).
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practice of refusing to engage in dialogue165 and opens the door to state-
led negotiations. First authorized under the still-classified 2002 presiden-
tial directive,166 the permission to communicate with hostage-takers was at
that time interpreted broadly to permit ransoms negotiated either as a
lure167 or where the process promised to yield valuable intelligence that
could be used to prevent further terrorist activities.168 By using ransoms to
further state interests, officials operating under this policy recognized that
an option to negotiate does not signal the acknowledgment of non-state
actors as on equal footing with states. Far from somehow legitimizing their
actions or existence,169 such negotiations instead open the door to strate-
gic gathering of information that may lead to the identity of the perpetra-
tors, the whereabouts of the victims, or other essential intelligence
typically sought by the state.170
When viewed in light of prior practices, the U.S. changes indicate a
significant shift toward a permissive policy on ransom payments and serve
as a valuable model for future development among states. The structural
changes address many of the issues raised in Section II pertaining to inter-
state coordination and lack of transparency, while the shift in policy pro-
vides enhanced clarity surrounding the lawfulness of ransoms negotiated
at the private level. While the lawfulness of state-initiated negotiations is
perhaps less clear, the ability to communicate with hostage-takers may
165. See Harris, supra note 133. The practice of refusing to communicate with hostage-
takers was at odds with the 2002 presidential directive, which governed hostage situations
until its replacement in 2015. According to former chief of the FBI’s Crisis Negotiation Unit
Gary Noesner and others who read the directive, the change in FBI and DOJ operations was
not due to the state of the law, but the practices that arose in implementing it. See Callimachi,
supra note 129 (“The policy of no concession has always been there, but we used to interpret
it in a much more flexible way.”).
166. Harris, supra note 133.
167. Callimachi, supra note 133.
168. Harris, supra note 133. This approach demonstrated some measure of achieve-
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provide a basis for the strategic use of ransoms in pursuance of state
interests.
The similarly permissive approach to negotiations adopted by other
Western states likewise demonstrates a growing regional consensus in
favor of such methods. Whereas the U.S. model previously restricted its
use of ransom payments to only those instances in which valuable informa-
tion could be extracted, other states have demonstrated a willingness to
negotiate for humanitarian purposes more broadly, with the hostage’s re-
lease as the only known justification for such payments. Still, countries’
continued denial of facilitating payments renders it unlikely that they
would officially authorize ransoms via international agreement or Security
Council resolution;171 however, the increasing willingness to negotiate
ransoms may serve as a basis for state practice in favor of this option.
CONCLUSION
In sum, the international legal framework governing hostage situa-
tions, far from providing much-needed clarity and guidance, instead gener-
ates uncertainty as to the lawfulness of ransom payments. Whereas the
Terrorist Financing Convention and Resolution 1373 subject those accused
of terrorist financing to both the assets freeze and criminal penalties, more
recent resolutions impose only the former sanction against those who pay
ransoms. Moreover, given the preventive rather than punitive purpose of
the assets freeze,172 the lawfulness of ransoms under international law re-
mains unclear.173
171. The lack of domestic provisions explicitly permitting ransoms (in contrast, for ex-
ample, with an option to communicate with hostage-takers, as provided for in Presidential
Policy Directive 30) highlights the unlikelihood that states would enshrine a permissive policy
in an international agreement. No state has adopted legislation permitting ransom payments
in response to hostage situations; instead, the covert negotiations undertaken by states al-
leged to pay ransoms, together with their general denial of having done so, may indicate
states’ understanding of “the difference between promoting . . . versus preserving negotiation
in difficult contexts.” Bento, supra note 9, at 332. While an agreement permitting ransoms
might be interpreted as a promotion thereof, the subtler ability to “communicate” preserves
negotiation as a permissible option and avoids legitimizing terrorist actors or endorsing their
activities. For an argument in favor of enacting a national law permitting ransoms, see Weill,
supra note 64, at 217–34. For the potential of such an approach to be perceived as legitimiz-
ing or acknowledging terrorist actors, see Faure, supra note 169, at 187–89; Bento, supra note
9, at 288–89, 313–17, 323–24.
172. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
173. As of this writing, it is too early to observe the effects of the most recent resolu-
tions on national legal systems. The reporting mechanism of Resolution 2199, which requires
states to report to the U.N. al-Qaida Sanctions Monitoring Team on actions to counter ter-
rorist-financing, may shed light on states’ policy changes (if any) with regard to ransom
financers. S.C. Res. 2199, ¶ 29 (Feb. 12, 2015); Procedural Note: Member State Reporting
Requirements of Resolution 2199 (Mar. 27, 2015), http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/pdf/
Res2199ProceduralNote.pdf. At the international level, the failure of the GTCF, CTC, the
FATF, or the Sanctions Committee to suggest sanctions against ransom financers points to-
ward the permissiveness of such payments during the present period.
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We have also seen that the divergent positions states have adopted in
response to the ransom dilemma mirror the uncertainty at the interna-
tional level. No sanctions have yet been imposed against any nation for
facilitating ransom payments;174 instead, some states continue to negotiate
or preserve the ability of private sector partners to do so, even when pub-
licly advocating for the no-concessions stance. The inability of this position
to account for the interests of the private sector or confront the challenge
of terrorism more broadly confirms the limitations inherent in the permis-
sive approach. On the other hand, the limited effectiveness of a ransom
prohibition in deterring kidnappings and the increased risk this approach
poses to hostages weighs against the ban as a desirable alternative.
Instead, it has been argued that states should adopt a more dominant
role in their domestic spheres to confront hostage situations while coordi-
nating with the private sector to streamline the response process. Where
rescue operations are contemplated, states should collaborate to avoid
conflicts and to facilitate multilateral action, particularly in cases involving
states without armed forces at their disposal. Where such operations pose
substantial risk to the hostage, however, the ability to negotiate a ransom
should be preserved as a permissible alternative. As states endeavor to
overcome their differences of approach to hostage situations, it is impor-
tant to recognize that the response to kidnapping is but one part of the
overarching problem that terrorist organizations represent to the interna-
tional community. Any attempt to confront kidnappings must consider
that collective component of counterterrorism.
174. See Tom Keatinge, The Price of Freedom: When Governments Pay Ransoms, FOR-
EIGN AFFAIRS (Aug. 13, 2014), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2014-08-13/
price-freedom.
